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Abstract of Dissertation 
 
Moscow’s Dual Foreign Policy: Soviet Ideologized Foreign Policy and the Pursuit of all-
European Collective Security 
1954-1989 
 
“The dissertation argues that from the 1950s to the late 1980s, the Soviet Union 
pursued two often contradictory foreign policies in Europe– one, ideologized foreign 
policy, Moscow’s commitment to which will be explored though case studies, and 
another policy of peaceful coexistence exemplified by the Soviet long-term campaign for 
all-European collective security system. Moscow often had to prioritize one policy over 
the other and was not totally committed to either. I demonstrate that in the early 1980s, 
with the fall of détente and the eruption of the Polish crisis, the two policies became 
incompatible and the Soviets were forced to choose between the two, which ultimately 
contributed to the end of the Cold War.” 
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1. Introduction 
 
The factors which contributed to the peaceful end of the Cold War have been the 
subject of considerable research and theorizing among scholars. In order to solve the 
puzzle posed by Gorbachev’s diplomacy in 1985-1989, historians and political scientists 
have studied issues such as the impact of “new ideas” on Soviet foreign policy, 
Gorbachev’s trust in the West, the process of Soviet identity change through interaction 
with Western leaders, and the role of civil society, as well as the material conditions 
which determined Moscow’s policy choices. In line with this research, I’m interested in 
one of the factors which according to the most recent scholarship was responsible for the 
Soviet non-use of force in Eastern Europe in 1989 – the concept of common European 
Home. According to Svetlana Savranskaya and Jacques Lévesque the concept, which 
meant for Gorbachev the political and economic integration of the USSR into Europe, 
was the single most important driving force behind Moscow’s foreign policy in 1988-
1989.
1
 Created as part of Gorbachev’s new thinking, the concept of common European 
home underwent different stages of development. By 1987, it entailed the building of a 
new European collective security framework through the transformation of NATO and 
the Warsaw Pact into political organizations and their eventual dissolution; the peaceful 
resolution of conflicts (which implied the renunciation of the use of force in foreign 
policy), and the promotion of pan-European economic and trade cooperation.
2
 Most of 
these ideas, however, were not really new – in fact, they were promoted by Soviet leaders 
in one form or another at different points in time between 1954 and 1989. In this 
dissertation I am interested in exploring the long-term evolution of Soviet ideas about all-
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European collective security. The related questions that I will examine are: i) To what 
extent were the ideas embodied in the common European concept new?; ii) How did they 
evolve over time?; iii) To what degree were they shared by the Soviet leadership?; and 
iv) How did these ideas relate to Soviet ideologized foreign policy? To attempt answering 
these questions, I analyze key Soviet foreign policy diplomatic initiatives and their 
relation (if any) to crisis-management decisions with respect to Moscow’s Warsaw Pact 
allies and Western Europe. On one hand, I examine concrete cases of shifts of ideas 
which are related to all-European collective security. On the other hand, I explore case 
studies of Soviet crisis management (Poland and Hungary in 1956, Czechoslovakia in 
1968, Poland in 1980-1981 and the peaceful revolutions in 1989) to test Soviet 
commitment to an ideologized foreign policy and to see if and how these crises affected 
the Soviet pursuit of collective European security.  Studying these crises is particularly 
appropriate since they reflected the Kremlin’s foreign policy thinking. The crises 
threatened the Soviet status quo in Eastern Europe and therefore constituted a hard test 
for the limits of the Soviet tolerance for reforms. In order to provide a general 
background to Moscow’s changing ideas regarding all-European collective security, I 
will first show in the introduction that the strategic ideas embodied in the common 
European home concept have their antecedents in earlier foreign policies and proposals 
promoted by the Soviet leadership.  I will then argue that, from the 1950s to the late 
1980s, the Soviet Union pursued two often contradictory foreign policies in Europe– one, 
ideologized foreign policy, Moscow’s commitment to which will be explored though case 
studies, and another policy of peaceful coexistence exemplified by the Soviet long-term 
campaign for an all-European collective security system. Moscow often had to prioritize 
one policy over the other and was not totally committed to either. I demonstrate that in 
the early 1980s, with the fall of détente and the eruption of the Polish crisis, the two 
policies became incompatible and the Soviets were forced to choose between the two, 
which ultimately contributed to the end of the Cold War. 
The historiography on the Cold War is vast and the literature on the final years of 
the conflict is constantly growing. The framework chosen here focuses on the debate 
regarding the different material and ideational factors which contributed to the end of the 
Cold War. It is only within this framework and in the context of Gorbachev’s new 
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thinking and Moscow’s relations with Western leaders that the complexity of the concept 
of common European home and its importance for Gorbachev’s foreign policy choices 
can be fully grasped. The next section will therefore proceed as follows: first, I examine 
the debate on the end of the Cold War by focusing on possible explanations stressing 
material factors, the role of ideas and the impact of personalities; second, I trace the 
development of the concept of common European home from 1985 to 1989 which allows 
a deeper understanding of its basic ideas; third, I examine briefly the roots of these 
strategic ideas within the Soviet political establishment; fourth, I present the methodology 
and the sources that have been used. 
 
1.1 Existing Historiography on the End of the Cold War 
The literature on the end of the Cold War has focused on the material 
international and domestic context and the role of ideas and personalities in order to 
explain Moscow’s diplomacy in 1985-1990. 
The decline of the USSR’s economic and military power relative to the West, and 
Moscow’s perception of this trend have often been cited as one of the main reasons for 
the Soviet foreign policy of retrenchment.
3
  According to this perspective, by the mid-to-
late 1970s the Soviet Union was affected by a systemic crisis as the country’s growth rate 
and economic performance steadily declined.  Brooks and Wohlforth, among others, have 
argued that the USSR’s isolation from the globalization of production and the 
international economy, its lag behind the West in the scientific and technological 
revolution and Moscow’s rising defence burden and the economic costs of subsidizing its 
Eastern European satellites created powerful incentives for a reorientation of Soviet 
foreign policy in the 1980s.
4
 Traditional realist accounts have emphasized the pressure 
exerted on the Soviet Union by the American military buildup, Reagan’s pursuit of the 
SDI, and Western competitive economic policies which represented an insurmountable 
                                                          
3 Randall Schweller and William C. Wohlforth, ‘Power Test: Evaluating Realism in Response to the End of 
the Cold War’, Security Studies, 9 (2000). 
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International Security, 25 (2000), p. 23-38. 
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challenge for the declining Soviet economy.
5
 The role of SDI and the American buildup 
in forcing Kremlin to invest more in defense, and ultimately to make concessions on arms 
control, however, is not supported by clear data, and has been challenged by Garthoff and 
FitzGerald.
6
 Writing on Gorbachev’s diplomacy, Rice and Zelikow have argued that by 
1989 an exhausted Soviet Union could no longer resist the leap towards liberty in Eastern 
Europe, while Bush, Kohl, Mitterrand and Thatcher seized the opportunity and acted with 
skill and speed to secure German unification on Western terms.
7
 Ultimately, having 
missed several opportunities during the Malta summit and the Two-Plus-Four 
negotiations to tie the issue of German unification to NATO’s future expansion eastward, 
Gorbachev was “bribed out” of Germany by Helmut Kohl’s skillful checkbook 
diplomacy.
8
 
The Soviet domestic economic and financial crisis, the growing instability and 
indebtedness of the Eastern European satellites, along with the rise of nationalism within 
the USSR (the Baltic States and Azerbaijan) have been stated as another reason for 
Moscow’s foreign policy concessions in the late 1980s.9 Mastny and Ouimet have 
demonstrated that the financially draining Soviet war in Afghanistan and the 1980-81 
Polish crisis, in particular, led to an early reevaluation of the Soviet commitment to 
socialist internationalism and of the costs involved in subsidizing the Eastern European 
states.
10
 Significantly, in 1981, the Soviet leaders unanimously ruled out a military 
intervention in Poland as being beyond Soviet capabilities, which signaled the end of the 
Brezhnev Doctrine and was a precursor of Gorbachev’s policy of non-interference in the 
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domestic affairs of Soviet satellites in Eastern Europe. Thus, some scholars have seen 
Poland, already plagued by economic and sociopolitical crisis by 1980, as leading the 
way to end the Cold War.
11
 Bennett and Lévesque have demonstrated that in 1988 the 
leadership in both Hungary and Poland had taken steps to accommodate the opposition 
by embarking on programs of political and economic reform, and by 1989 the 
independence movements in Eastern Europe could not be crushed without endangering 
the socioeconomic and sociopolitical systems in these countries.
12
 Declassified Soviet 
documents also show that the growing external debts of the Warsaw Pact states and in 
particular the precarious situation in Poland and Hungary, where economic collapse was 
expected, warned Moscow against attempts to maintain the status quo in Eastern Europe 
which would have placed an excessive burden on the Soviet economy.
13
 Koslowski and 
Kratochwil, on the other hand, have argued that the strengthening of the civil societies in 
Eastern Europe, and Gorbachev’s fear of jeopardizing perestroika and upsetting the 
Soviet relations with the West prevented Moscow from using force to suppress the 1989 
revolutions.
14
 With respect to the GDR, traditional accounts underscore the growing 
destabilization of the country in 1989 and Moscow’s inability to bankroll it, thus stressing 
that Gorbachev found himself with no other alternative than to agree to German 
unification in exchange for Western economic aid. Newnham, for instance, has suggested 
that economic incentives such as food aid, bank loans and trade deals offered by Kohl at 
key moments of the West German-Soviet negotiations played a central role in convincing 
Gorbachev to accept German unification on Bonn’s political and military terms.15 For 
other scholars, however, it was not the financial value of Western economic incentives 
which was most important for Gorbachev, but the prospect they gave of securing a long-
term co-operative relationship with the West.
16
 Germany was considered a close partner 
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in the future common European home, and therefore, its membership in a transformed 
NATO was seen as compatible with Soviet interests.
17
 
In this line, some constructivist accounts have focused on the shift of ideas and on 
the personal relationships and trust that the encounters between Gorbachev, Mitterrand, 
Reagan and Thatcher and Soviet-American meetings and the Reykjavik and Malta 
summits helped to develop, thereby making the peaceful end of the Cold War possible.
18
 
In the atmosphere of co-operation and understanding, Gorbachev redefined traditional 
security concepts and was persuaded by Kohl, Bush and Baker that Soviet interests would 
be better secured by Germany’s membership in NATO.19 Other scholars have explored 
the long-term influence of ideas on the Soviet leadership. Evangelista, for example, has 
studied the impact of transnational actors, “epistemic communities”, on the Soviet 
leaders’ and experts’ ideas regarding arms control, strategic defense and nuclear testing.20 
The shift of ideas among the Soviet leadership has also been ascribed to the long-term 
gradual erosion of communist ideology.
21
 Arguably, the latter’s impact on Soviet foreign 
policy could be observed as early as the late 1940 from which point on very little 
innovation was introduced by the leading ideologues Zhdanov and Suslov.
22
 Perhaps one 
of the best constructivist alternatives to Wohlforth’s realist interpretation of the end of the 
Cold War, which emphasizes the material constraints that brought about a shift in the 
Soviet foreign policy, has been articulated by Robert English. English traces the origins 
and development of “new thinking” back to the 1950s post-Stalinist generation of 
intellectual elites with reformist values and beliefs and identity of a neo-Westernizing 
                                                                                                                                                                             
Soviet Side of German Unification’, in Cold War Endgame: Oral History, Analysis, Debates, ed. by William 
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17
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20
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orientation.
23
 He argues that Gorbachev greatly benefited from his exposure to the 
reformers’ social democratic ideas about socialism’s liberal-humanistic revival and the 
need for more extensive East-West cooperation.
24
 Bennett and Zubok have also 
highlighted Gorbachev’ formative and subsequent experiences through the 1956 and 
1968 events in Hungary and Czechoslovakia, which were different from those of the 
Stalinist World War II generation, in order to explain his and Shevardnadze’s aversion to 
the use of force and their preoccupation with arms control in the aftermath of the 
Chernobyl catastrophe.
25
  
Finally, a number of scholars have highlighted the role of personalities for the 
peaceful end of the Cold War.  Archie Brown, for example, singles out Gorbachev from 
previous Soviet leaders for his strong drive for innovation and desire to learn from the 
likes of Mitterrand, Thatcher, Nixon and González, thus pointing to Gorbachev himself 
as the most important factor for the demise of the Cold War.
26
 On the American side, 
several authors underscore the central role played by Gorbachev in advancing new ideas, 
in acknowledging the extent of the USSR’s domestic economic crisis and in taking steps 
to reduce the defense spending and sign arms reduction agreements, while others 
emphasize both Gorbachev’s and Reagan’s ideas, personal characteristics and courage 
which allowed them to build a relationship based on trust.
27
 Oberdorfer takes a more 
general approach and highlights the role of senior officials and their negotiating abilities 
citing in particular the contributions of Gorbachev, Reagan, Shevardnadze, Bush and 
Baker.
28
 
While all these material and ideational factors contribute to the understanding of 
the context in which Gorbachev was operating, they are insufficient to explain Moscow’s 
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choices in the Cold War endgame. The most recent scholarship has, therefore, examined 
other contingent factors which affected Soviet policy-making. Using recently declassified 
materials from the Soviet archives and writing on the Soviet non-use of force in 1989, 
Savranskaya, for example, has argued that, for Gorbachev, traditional considerations 
about security and the balance of power were of secondary importance to the integration 
of the Soviet Union into Europe.
29
 Suppressing the 1989 revolutions by military means 
was never considered by the new thinkers or the conservatives since such a move would 
have endangered the relations with the West and the creation of a new European security 
system. Similarly, Jacques Lévesque has suggested that a major preoccupation in the fall 
of 1989 for Gorbachev was that the creation of all-European structures, a common 
European home, would not precede the unification of Germany.
30
 In fact, Moscow’s fear 
of being left aside from the pan-European process was a common theme of all the Soviet 
proposals to Bonn and Washington regarding the status of a unified Germany.
31
 Julie 
Newton’s research has also demonstrated how Gorbachev’s reliance on the mentorship of 
François Mitterrand weakened Moscow’s negotiating position, and convinced Gorbachev 
to accept Germany’s membership in NATO. For Newton, the vague, idealistic and 
interchangeable language Mitterrand used with Gorbachev in discussions of the common 
European home concealed their clashing visions of European integration.
32
  
 
 
1.2 The Concept of Common European Home 
Whereas Savranskaya, Lévesque and Newton discuss the common European 
house concept in view of explaining issues such as the peaceful Soviet withdrawal from 
Eastern Europe and the failure of the USSR, France and Britain to coalesce and slow 
down German unification, I am interested in the evolution of the concept’s strategic 
ideas. The expression common European home was not invented by Gorbachev. It was 
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 Savranskaya, ‘The Logic of 1989’. 
30
 Lévesque, ‘In the name of Europe’s’, p. 98. 
31
 Ibid., p. 97. 
32
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Europe-Asia Studies, 65 (2013), p. 297. 
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first used in 1972 by Gromyko in a conversation with the French president Pompidou in 
order to convince him to support the proposal for a Conference on Security and 
Cooperation in Europe and then in 1982 by Brezhnev in the context of a speech given in 
Bonn regarding public opinion.
33
 The expression was mentioned again by Gorbachev in 
December 1984 in his speech before the British Parliament where he famously 
proclaimed: “Europe is our common home, a home, not a theatre of military operations”. 
Between 1985 when Gorbachev ascended to the position of General Secretary and 1989 
when the peaceful revolutions in Eastern Europe took place, the concept went through 
different phases of development. In its initial phase 1985-1986, it was part of a pragmatic 
approach to ensure the support of the Western European governments on the European 
missile question and thereby it aimed at splitting the Americans from their NATO allies. 
By late 1986, the concept became an integral part of Gorbachev’s new diplomatic 
principles, the “New Thinking”, and it centered on strategic issues and on questions of 
disarmament. According to Chernyaev, throughout this period, Gorbachev embraced a 
version of Khrushchev’s theory of peaceful coexistence and argued in favor of strategic 
sufficiency.
34
 In its third final phase of development (late 1987 to 1990), the common 
European home came to mean the building of a new pan-European security order on the 
foundations set by the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe. According to a 
number of speeches given by Gorbachev in Prague, Belgrade and Strasbourg between 
1987 and 1989, the concept involved the creation of a collective security structure based 
on nuclear, chemical and conventional disarmament, the transformation of NATO and the 
Warsaw Pact into political organizations and their eventual dissolution by year 2000, the 
renunciation of the use of force in foreign policy, the deepening of the economic and 
trade cooperation between the Soviet Union and Western Europe, as well as the creation 
of a true European cultural community.
35
 Significantly, Gorbachev envisioned the 
reunification of Germany as the final stage of the erection of an all-European collective 
security system which would anchor the Soviet Union and its satellites in Europe. 
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 Zubok, ‘Gorbachev and the End of the Cold War’, p. 64. 
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My particular interest in the concept of common European home stems from the 
fact that many of the ideas embodied in it were not as groundbreaking as it has been often 
assumed. To begin, in the period 1919-1928 the Bolsheviks had developed two foreign 
policies which often undermined each other - a policy devised to promote the world 
revolutionary process was put forward by Bukharin and supported by Zinoviev and a 
second policy of peaceful coexistence favoring conventional diplomatic and economic 
relations with the Western states was promoted by Lenin.
36
 The duality of the 
Bolsheviks’ foreign policy was expressed in their effort to achieve national security by 
cultivating diplomatic relations with the West, while also promoting revolutionary 
activities when the conditions were favorable.
37
 During the Second World War  period, 
the two policies were epitomized by the ideologically based discourse favoured by Stalin 
and Molotov, and Litvinov’s realist approach to foreign policy which stressed the need 
for agreements and institutions which would constrain great power relations.
38
 Indeed, 
these two directions in Soviet foreign policy from the 1920s are visible through the 1930s 
to the 1980s. For instance, in the 1930s and the early 1940s Litvinov favoured a 
cooperative approach with the West. He put forward proposals for the creation of a 
collective security system to contain Nazi Germany, worked to secure the inclusion of the 
Soviet Union in Briand’s pan-European project and pursued a defensive alliance with 
France.
39
 Gorbachev’s idea of building an all-European security structure integrating 
Russia which would then lead the way to German unification also has antecedents in 
Stalin’s and Molotov’s foreign policy. In 1952, for example, Stalin proposed the 
reunification of Germany in exchange for a peace treaty guaranteeing the German state’s 
neutrality.
40
 It is unclear whether Stalin’s offer was sincere but some evidence suggest 
that a chance for reunification might have existed since Stalin wanted to prevent West 
German rearmament and integration into NATO and rather preferred to see a unified and 
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neutral German state.
41
 There are also indications that Beria and Malenkov saw East 
Germany as an economic liability and were ready to exchange a socialist GDR for 
détente with the West in 1953.
42
  Perhaps the most important precursor of Gorbachev’s 
European home idea was the 1954 draft treaty prepared by Molotov for the Berlin 
Conference of Foreign Ministers, which proposed the creation of a pan-European 
collective security organization as a step towards a peace treaty for Germany.
43
  
In my dissertation, therefore, I am interested in exploring the long-term evolution 
of Soviet ideas about all-European collective security. The time period under 
consideration spans from Molotov’s 1954 détente initiatives to 1989 when the Soviet 
control over Eastern Europe crumbled. The year 1954 is also chosen as a starting point 
because the death of Stalin in 1953 allowed for revision of the notion that war between 
the capitalist and communist systems was unavoidable, thereby opening the door for 
Khrushchev’s “peaceful coexistence”. In 1989, the peaceful revolutions in Eastern 
Europe, Kohl’s Ten-Point Plan and Mitterrand’s support for German reunification 
significantly weakened the Soviet position and compromised Gorbachev’s vision of 
Common European Home. 
 
 
 
1.3 Novelty of the research topic 
 An examination of this question is relevant for two reasons. First, the concept of a 
common European home and its origins has so far been rather overlooked in the literature 
on the end of the Cold War. In the last twenty years very few scholars other than Rey, 
Savranskaya, Lévesque and Newton have written on the topic, which is surprising given 
its importance for Gorbachev’s foreign policy. Moreover, the majority of the pre-1991 
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42
 Zubok and Pleshakov, p. 159. 
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scholarly articles dealing with the concept focus either on its political and cultural aspects 
or on its role as a practical tool intended to promote East-West European rapprochement 
and to weaken the NATO alliance. Second, by examining the evolution of the ideas 
embodied in the concept my ultimate objective is to provide a complementary long-term 
perspective on the end of the Cold War. While some of the existing explanations (ex. 
Robert English) adopt a bottom-up approach by focusing on the development of civil 
society in Eastern Europe and the USSR, my approach is top-down in that it surveys the 
roots and development of the strategic ideas of the concept inside the Soviet political 
establishment over a period of thirty-six years. Contrary to Cold War endgame 
explanations which emphasize the role of Gorbachev (for instance, Archie Brown’s 
“Gorbachev factor”), his personality (Zubok) or his relations with Western leaders, my 
intention is to examine the Soviet leadership’s approach with regard to the policies of 
détente and peaceful coexistence beginning with Molotov’s diplomatic efforts in 1954-
1955 to build an all-European system of collective security. The advantage of such an 
approach is that it helps to see Gorbachev’s initiatives in the backdrop of previous 
policies or proposals by Molotov, Khrushchev and Brezhnev. The long-term perspective 
also permits an examination of the continuous struggle of the Soviet leadership in  the 
period 1954-1989 in the pursuit of two often conflicting policies – an ideologized foreign 
policy characterized by Soviet commitment to socialist internationalism on the one hand, 
and a policy of peaceful coexistence on the other, exemplified by the search for all-
European collective security. In this respect, analyzing the Soviet response to the 
uprisings and crises in Eastern Europe (the case studies of Hungary and Poland in 1956; 
Czechoslovakia in 1968, Poland in 1980-1981, and the peaceful revolutions in 1989) is 
particularly appropriate because these crises tested the Soviet commitment to an 
ideologized foreign policy and Moscow’s willingness to allow change to the Cold War 
status quo. An exploration of the crises also demonstrates that the Soviet commitment to 
ideological rationales was never total. The Soviets’ decisions to use coercive methods 
were never automatic and were preceded by long debates in the Politburo. Politburo 
members who were usually considered as the Soviet “hawks” and “doves” frequently 
shifted sides during the deliberations. For instance, Suslov, Mikoyan and Marshal 
Zhukov favored a political solution in Hungary in 1956 in the days preceding the second 
13 
 
military intervention.
44
 Similarly, Brezhnev gave his approval for the intervention in 
Czechoslovakia only after a long period of indecision on his part regarding the use of 
force and in the context of major disagreements within the Politburo on the appropriate 
course of action.
45
 An exploration of the Soviet diplomatic initiatives, on one hand, and 
crisis management, on the other, illuminates the dialectic between the two policies.  
 
1.4 Methodology 
  My dissertation consists of three sections. The first section provides a brief 
overview of the Soviet diplomatic initiatives regarding all-European collective security 
system. The second section analyzes case studies of Soviet crisis management experience 
in Eastern Europe in order to test Soviet commitment to an ideologized foreign policy 
(and where appropriate, the dialectic between ideas about collective European security 
and the Soviet practice of foreign policy). These are Hungary and Poland in 1956, 
Czechoslovakia in 1968, Poland in 1980-1981 and the peaceful revolutions in Eastern 
Europe in 1989. A special attention is paid to the Soviet willingness to use force and to 
the role of leaders in the decision-making process. The third section is analytical in nature 
and examines the Soviet efforts to reconcile these contradictory policies.  
 
1.5 Sources  
In examining the question, I will adopt an inductive and interpretive approach 
based on the research of primary sources such as memoirs, extracts from diaries, 
memorandums, addresses and records of conversations between Soviet and Eastern 
European and Western leaders. The memoirs of Soviet leaders such as Khrushchev and 
Gorbachev and those of Soviet statesmen, diplomats and foreign policy advisors such as 
Gromyko, Molotov, Ligachev, Shevardnadze, Arbatov, Chernyaev and Grachev are 
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crucial since they reveal the internal thinking and the political motives of the Soviet 
leadership. There is significantly more information in the form of memoirs, interviews 
and oral history conferences on the views of the new thinkers (Gorbachev, Shevardnadze, 
Chernyaev and the circle of reformers). As a result, the conservatives’ accounts and 
recollections, often published in Russian, have been rather overlooked by Western 
scholars. More sources are also available regarding the Soviet leaders’ thinking during 
the last years of the Cold War. To deal with these problems I have attempted to integrate 
the accounts of both new thinkers and conservatives from the Gorbachev period 
whenever this was pertinent to the discussion. I have also used the memoirs of Molotov 
(in the form of conversations), Khrushchev and Gromyko since they offer evidence 
difficult to find elsewhere on the Soviet foreign policy initiatives in the 1950s. An 
obvious bias of memoirs is that the authors tend to exaggerate their own role in the 
described events and attempt to justify or present their actions in a positive light while 
denigrating the views or the contributions of their adversaries.  Memoires and Politburo 
minutes also might not reveal the thinking of the decision-makers and don’t always 
answer the question of how and why a particular decision was finally reached. For 
instance, the decision not to intervene militarily in Poland in 1956 seems to have been 
taken ad-hoc by Khrushchev. In my analysis I have incorporated a variety of Soviet, 
Czech, Polish and Hungarian primary sources such as minutes from meetings, speeches, 
reports, cables, letters, dispatches, records of telephone conversations and so on, in order 
to get an accurate understanding of the events in question. These documents are available 
in English in collections of historical documents such as: The 1956 Hungarian 
Revolution: A History in Documents, The Prague Spring 1968: A National Security 
Archive Documents Reader, Soviet Deliberations during the Polish Crisis 1980-1981, 
From Solidarity to Martial Law: The Polish Crisis of 1980-1981: A Documentary 
History.  Another volume of primary sources on the Soviet policy in the last years of the 
Cold War which I have used extensively is the recently published Masterpieces of 
History: The Soviet Peaceful Withdrawal from Eastern Europe. Other documents such as 
the diaries of Anatoly Chernyaev, who was one of Gorbachev’s foreign policy advisors 
during the final years of the Cold War, are accessible on the websites of The National 
Security Archive of George Washington University and Wilson Center’s Cold War 
15 
 
International History Project. Due to time constraints, I have been selective in Russian 
sources I have used. I have selectively consulted articles from the two major Soviet 
newspapers Pravda, the main political newspaper of the Central Committee of the CPSU, 
and Izvestiia. One of the problems with these articles is that they reflect the official 
political line that was adopted, but usually don’t reveal the real thinking of the Soviet 
leadership – many are pieces of propaganda and were meant to provide justification for 
Moscow’s foreign policy.  For this reason and because the analysis here deals with Soviet 
foreign policy decision making I have relied more extensively on other Soviet and 
Eastern European declassified materials.  
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2. Moscow’s Pursuit of Collective European Security, 1954-1989 
The Soviet leadership’s campaign for an all-European security system from the 
1950s to the 1980s can be seen as a continuation of Litvinov’s multilateral and collective 
security approach to international relations from the 1940s which was aimed at achieving 
Soviet national security by promoting cooperative diplomatic relations with the West.
46
 
From the mid-1950s to the 1970s, the Soviet leaders continually pursued the idea of 
convening a European security conference as a forum for addressing the questions of 
improving European security and strengthening mutual cooperation.
47
 The creation of an 
overarching East-West security organization remained a constant long-term objective of 
the Soviet foreign policy until the late 1980s despite the end of the Thaw and the 
escalation of the Cold War in the 1960s, late 1970s and early 1980s. Molotov, 
Khrushchev, Brezhnev and Gorbachev all called for an all-European collective security 
system as an answer to Soviet political and security concerns in Europe and later on also 
as a solution to the Soviet bloc increasing economic problems. 
The Berlin Conference of Foreign Ministers (January 25 to February 18, 1954) 
was the first conference after the Second World War where the Soviet proposal for a pan-
European collective security system was discussed. The Soviets hoped for the signing of 
a European collective security treaty which would provide an alternative to the European 
Defense Community and would prevent German rearmament.
48
 With this objective in 
mind, on 10 February 1954, Molotov submitted a draft general Treaty on collective 
security in Europe which foresaw neutralization and confederal arrangements as a step 
towards German unification.
49
 According to the proposal, participation in an all-European 
collective security system would have been open to all European states regardless of their 
political, social or economic systems.
50
 The draft proposal included a collective defense 
clause stipulating that an armed attack against one or more of the signatories would be 
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considered an attack against all of them.
51
 Significantly, just as Gorbachev, who saw the 
creation of a common European house as a first step towards German unification in the 
late 1980s, in 1954, Moscow perceived pan-European collective security arrangements as 
the necessary prerequisite for a peace treaty and the unification of Germany.
 52
  
In March 1954, Moscow pursued its campaign for all-European security structure 
by proposing to join NATO and change the nature of the alliance into a collective 
security system.
 53
  For instance, Moscow announced two amendments to the draft treaty 
about collective security in Europe presented at the Berlin Conference according to which 
the United States would be allowed to participate in a system of European collective 
security and the Soviet Union would consider joining NATO if the organization 
relinquished its aggressive character.
54
 It was the rejection by the Western states of this 
Soviet proposal that contributed to the Soviet decision to establish its own military 
alliance. 
It is significant that the creation of the Warsaw Pact on 14 May 1955 was 
motivated by political reasons and was meant to counter the consolidation of NATO. The 
significance of political considerations in the establishment of the organization is visible 
in the fact that the Soviet foreign ministry rather than the general staff was charged with 
the planning of the alliance.
55
 The timing of the creation of the Warsaw Pact, a day before 
the signing of the Austrian State Treaty, which was the most substantial achievement of 
détente, was significant, since it was intended to induce the West to negotiate with 
Moscow on the creation of a new European security system which would replace NATO 
and the Warsaw Pact.
56
 The Warsaw Treaty also stipulated the desire of the contracting 
parties to put in place a “system of European collective security based on the 
participation of all European states irrespective of their social and political systems” 
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which would allow them to unite their efforts in safeguarding the peace in Europe.
57
 
Article 11 of the Treaty also specified that “should a system of collective security be 
established in Europe, and a General European Treaty of Collective Security concluded, 
the present Treaty shall cease to be operative from the day the General European Treaty 
enters into force”.58 This provision demonstrated the consistency of the Soviet diplomatic 
efforts to change the political and military balance in Europe. In this context, the second 
Conference of European Countries on Safeguarding European Peace and Security and the 
Warsaw Treaty can be seen as a continuation of the Soviet campaign for pan-European 
collective security which culminated with the presentation of a draft of the treaty at the 
four power summit at Geneva.
59
 Simultaneously, in 1955, Khrushchev promoted the 
concept of neutralism which was designed to prevent the expansion of NATO in Europe 
and which was part of broader strategy of trying to create a neutral buffer of states 
Europe between NATO and the Warsaw Pact.
60
 The 1955 Austrian State Treaty was 
connected to the consolidation of the East-West spheres of influence in Europe. It 
prevented the integration of Austria into a Western defense system and it had a strategic 
significance for the Soviet Union by separating the Southern Tier from the rest of 
NATO.
61
 
At the Geneva Summit (18-23 July 1955) and the Geneva Conference of Foreign 
Ministers (26 October to 16 November 1955), the Soviet leaders pursued a European 
collective security policy similar to that put forward at the Berlin Conference even 
though some important revisions were made. The Soviets adopted a new staged approach 
to Germany according to which Germany’s unification would be achieved gradually in 
the framework of a common collective security system allowing for the initial 
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coexistence of the two German states.
62
 The two-stage proposal of the Soviet delegation 
for the Geneva Summit envisioned a two to three year period during which the 
agreements and the structures of NATO and the Warsaw Pact would remain in place and 
the two sides would commit to nonaggression and political cooperation which would be 
then followed by the dissolution of the organizations and their replacement by a new pan-
European collective security system.
63
 The Soviets prepared plans for various proposals 
in case some of these were rejected by the West which denoted their increasingly flexible 
position and their unwavering desire for an agreement on European collective security.  
Moscow’s efforts to reach an agreement with the Western states on European 
collective security continued after 1955. For example, at the Twentieth Congress of the 
Communist Party in 1956, Khrushchev presented once again the Soviet plans for 
European collective security which entailed the reunification of Germany through the 
gradual rapprochement between the two states.
64
 By the end of 1957, trying to benefit 
from the favorable international situation after the flight of Sputnik, Khrushchev returned 
again to the idea of collective security in Europe and to his old campaign for the 
simultaneous dissolution of NATO and the Warsaw Pact.
65
 A Soviet draft of the NATO-
Warsaw Pact Nonaggression Treaty from 24 May 1958 proposed that the NATO and 
Warsaw Pact member states would pledge, among other things, not to resort to the use or 
threat of force against one another jointly or separately and would resolve conflicts only 
through peaceful means based on the principle of non-interference in the internal affairs 
of states.
66
 Four years later, in 1962, Moscow made several public demands for a NATO-
Warsaw Pact nonaggression treaty and solution to the German question.
 67
  
After a brief interruption in 1962, the Soviet campaign for European collective 
security resumed in the mid 1960s and climaxed with the Conference on Security and 
Cooperation in Europe in 1975. In a renewed effort to improve relations with the West, 
                                                          
62
 Roberts, Molotov, p. 161. 
63
 Ibid., p. 162. 
64
 Roberts, Molotov, p. 173. 
65
 Mastny, 'The Warsaw Pact', p. 12. 
66
 ‘Document  No. 8: Draft of a Warsaw Pact - NATO Nonagression Treaty, May 24, 1958’, in  A Cardboard 
Castle?: An Inside History of the Warsaw Pact, 1955-1991, ed. by V. Mastny and M. Byrne (New York : 
Central European University Press, 2005), p. 96. 
67
 Mastny, 'The Warsaw Pact', p. 20. 
20 
 
the Warsaw Pact’s Declaration on Strengthening Peace and Security in Europe from July 
1966 called for a European conference on security and co-operation and demanded that 
the European states “develop good-neighborly relations on the basis of the principles of 
independence and national sovereignty, equality, non-interference in internal affairs and 
mutual advantage” established upon the peaceful co-existence between states with 
different social systems.
68
 The declaration also reiterated the Soviet desire for the 
dissolution of NATO and the Warsaw Pact and their replacement by an all-European 
security system and it expressed the Soviet commitment to the resolution of international 
disputes through peaceful means.
69
   
Despite the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia and the annunciation of the 
Brezhnev Doctrine in 1968, both of which challenged the principle of non-interference in 
the internal affairs of the states endorsed previously by Moscow, the Soviet leaders 
continued to pursue détente and their goal of a European security conference. Contrary to 
previous plans for a European collective security system put forward by Molotov and 
Khrushchev, the 1969 proposal for a conference had the limited objective of obtaining the 
recognition by the West of the territorial and political status quo in Europe and a 
guarantee that it would not attempt to change it by using force.
70
 The question of German 
reunification was closed. Brezhnev believed that détente favored Moscow’s ideological 
objectives since “in conditions of relaxed international tensions, the arrow of the political 
barometer moves to the left”.71 This way of thinking was reminiscent of the Soviet 1920s 
dual policy of promoting peaceful coexistence and conventional diplomatic relations with 
the West in order to consolidate the new socialist republic and pursue the anti-imperialist 
struggle. In their 17 March 1969 appeal for a preparatory meeting to fix the agenda for a 
European security conference, the Warsaw Pact member states reiterated their usual 
proposals against the division of the world into military blocs and stated that the question 
of preventing military conflicts through the respect for the equality, independence and 
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sovereignty of countries was of major significance for the European states.
72
 By October 
1969, the Warsaw Pact member states had decided on two proposals on the agenda for 
the future conference – a declaration on the renunciation of force and a proposal for 
economic, technical and scientific cooperation.
73
 The proposals reflected the security, 
political and economic motivations behind the Soviet search for détente with the Western 
states. Significantly, by the mid-1960s Soviet and East European demands for collective 
European security conference were linked increasingly to the need for Western 
investments and technological assistance – a trend which would continue in the 1970s 
and 1980s.  
Convening of a European security conference and preserving détente in Europe 
remained one of the major long-term foreign policy objectives pursued by Brezhnev. 
According to a speech given by the Soviet leader at the January 1972 session of the PCC, 
Brezhnev expected a rapprochement between NATO and the Warsaw Pact to occur as 
soon as a consensus was reached with the West regarding the inviolability of borders, the 
nonuse of force or threat of force and non-interference in the affairs of the two blocs.
74
 
Brezhnev saw the Warsaw Pact’s future as a political rather than military alliance and 
anticipated NATO-Warsaw Pact political consultations, the creation of a common 
European political organ such as a consultative committee of secretariat and ultimately 
political cooperation.
75
 The Helsinki Final Act was seen by Moscow as the beginning of a 
new European security system.  It included key commitments on political, economic, 
social, military and human rights issues and provided to the Soviet Union the much 
needed Western credits.
76
 The achievements of the Helsinki Final Act were, however, 
overshadowed by decline of détente in the late 1970s with the Soviet invasion of 
Afghanistan. Desperate to preserve détente and to deal with the challenge of an ascendant 
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NATO, in the early 1980s, the Soviet leadership reviewed old ideas about a non-
aggression treaty between NATO and the Warsaw Pact.
77
  
Thus, by the late 1970s, it became increasingly obvious that the CSCE would not 
lead to the fulfillment of the vision of an all-European security structure that Moscow had 
in mind. The Soviet leadership also grew dissatisfied with the CSCE because of its focus 
on human rights and its imposition of principles of international and domestic behaviour 
which turned out to have a long-term destabilizing effect within the Soviet bloc. With 
Gorbachev becoming general secretary in 1985, however, the Helsinki CSCE process 
attracted renewed attention, and later in the 1980s it came to be seen by the Soviet 
reformers as the security framework upon which the common European home would be 
built. Like his predecessors, Gorbachev showed an interest towards a return to détente for 
political and economic reasons. Soon after he became general secretary, in a speech 
celebrating the fortieth anniversary of the Soviet victory over Germany in May 1945, 
Gorbachev stated that the process of détente had to be revived and described détente as a 
transitional stage towards the creation of a reliable and comprehensive system of 
international security.
 78
 At the 27
th
 party congress in 1986, Gorbachev reiterated this 
view by emphasizing the necessity to move forward towards a more “stable, secure 
détente” and from then on to a more reliable security on the basis of the Helsinki 
process.
79
 Gorbachev’s calls for collective European security system reflected the 
concurrent Soviet search for security, which now had not only a military and political, but 
also a very important economic dimension. The new Soviet understanding and pursuit of 
the different aspects of security was exemplified by the concept of common European 
home.  According to Gorbachev’s July 1989 address to the Council of Europe in 
Strasbourg, the common European home would be built on collective security (which 
entailed the rejection of the use and threat of force in international relations), on 
economic integration of all European states, on protection of the environment, and on 
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respect for human rights and law.
80
 Moreover, Gorbachev foresaw that the military 
organizations in Europe would dissolve gradually and that their security role would be 
assumed by the CSCE and the United Nations.
81
 Like Molotov before him, Gorbachev 
saw the creation of such pan-European security structure as a necessary step towards the 
reunification of Germany and the eventual dissolution of NATO and the Warsaw Pact.
82
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3. The 1956 Hungarian Revolution and the Polish October 
 
An important feature of Soviet policy during the Polish October was its 
unpredictability. Decisions seem to have been made in an ad-hoc manner and were 
influenced by the speed of events and the worsening situation in Hungary. Ideological 
concerns didn’t seem to be initially the main factor behind the Soviet decision-making 
with regards to Poland. Military issues, for instance, appeared to be the Soviets’ main 
preoccupation during Khrushchev’s visit to Poland in October 1956. According to 
Khrushchev’s memoirs, the anti-Soviet feelings of the new Polish leaders alarmed 
Moscow's officials, who felt that the Soviet lines of communication to the GDR were 
threatened, and that access to the Soviet troops there would be denied.
83
 Moscow saw the 
situation in Poland as serious enough to warrant the Soviets “to be ready to resort to 
arms”.84 However, the Soviet delegation which arrived in Warsaw on 19 October 1956 
didn’t have a clear plan on how to respond to the challenge posed by Poland’s political 
reforms. Despite the large scale mobilization of Soviet troops, it is unclear whether 
Moscow was actually prepared to proceed with a military intervention on 19 October.
85
 
Allusions and statements about resorting to military means in case Poland decided to 
leave the socialist bloc were made most notably during the Soviet-Polish talks at the 
Belvedere Palace.
86
 For instance, Khrushchev threatened that the CPSU was ready to 
“intervene brutally” in Polish internal affairs to protect its interests in Poland.87 The talks 
probably didn’t mark a turning point in Moscow’s policy as has been often assumed. 
Even after Khrushchev’s return from Warsaw, a final decision with respect to Poland was 
not immediately reached.  According to the notes of the CPSU CC Presidium session on 
20 October 1956, the Soviet leadership’s view was that there was “only one way out” of 
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the situation in Poland, and plans to proceed with military exercises were made.
88
 In spite 
of the fact that the military option remained valid, Moscow made significant efforts to 
find a political compromise with Gomulka. 
 The Soviet leaders employed a variety of methods, such as persuasion, different 
forms of coercive diplomacy, and threats in an effort to find a nonmilitary solution in 
Poland.
89
 For instance, while the Soviet-Polish talks on 19 October were taking place, 
units of the Northern group of the Soviet military stationed in Poland were advancing 
towards Warsaw.
90
 At the same time, Soviet warships entered the Bay of Gdansk and a 
state of increased readiness was introduced in the Belorussian, Kiev and Carpathian 
Military Districts, all in an effort to increase the pressure on the Polish negotiators.
91
 As 
the pro-Gomulka rallies continued, on 20 and 21 October the Soviet leadership also 
considered a variety of economic measures and military options, and launched a 
campaign in the Soviet press centering on the threat to socialism in Poland.
92
 In spite of 
the fact that a decision to withhold military action was reached by the CPSU Presidium 
on 21 October, the manoeuvres in Poland continued which led Gomulka to protest against 
the Soviet interference in Poland’s internal affairs during the 24 October satellite leaders’ 
meeting.
93
 Although the meeting didn’t put an end to the Soviet-Polish tensions, after 23 
October 1956, Moscow’s attention shifted to the worsening situation in Hungary.  The 
Soviet leaders most likely reached the practical decision that an agreement with the 
Polish leadership was preferable to an armed intervention. This view is corroborated by 
Khrushchev’s statement that finding a reason for an armed conflict with Poland would be 
very easy, but ending such a conflict would be very hard.
94
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Ultimately, several factors might explain the Soviet resolution not to proceed with 
a military invasion, the main one being that Gomulka did not challenge the status quo by 
demanding Poland’s withdrawal from the Warsaw Pact. In fact, with his sincerity and 
firm attitude during the Belvedere Palace talks, Gomulka reassured Khrushchev that 
Poland wanted to have friendly relations with the Soviet Union in order to protect its 
borders with the West, and that the Soviet-Polish relationship wouldn’t be affected by the 
country’s internal political problems.95 Gomulka was also insistent that Poland would 
maintain its communist system, and had no intention of leaving the Warsaw Pact.
96
 This 
argument was reiterated by the Polish leader at the 24 October CPSU Presidium meeting 
where he stressed that the presence of Soviet troops in Poland was required because of 
NATO and the American forces stationed in West Germany.
97
  Moreover, the popular 
support for Gomulka, who was seen by Moscow as a loyal communist, and the fact that 
the Polish society was united against Soviet military intervention, also played a role in 
persuading Moscow to reach an agreement with the new Polish leaders.
98
  
 
In the case of Poland, Moscow demonstrated a degree of tolerance which can be 
interpreted as an example of realpolitik flexibility. The evidence suggests that the 
Kremlin was somewhat careful in imposing its will upon the Polish leadership, especially 
once Gomulka made it clear that the country was not going to leave from the Warsaw 
Pact. In his memoirs, Khrushchev states that for historical reasons he always tried to be 
sympathetic with the outbursts of anti-Soviet sentiments in Poland.
99
 Gomulka himself 
was aware of Poland’s importance in Moscow’s security scheme, and used this fact to his 
advantage during the Belvedere Palace talks. He pointed out, for example, that Poland 
was not a Bulgaria or Hungary, but the most important country in the region, thus 
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emphasizing Poland’s geostrategic significance for the Warsaw Pact.100 The working 
notes of the 23 October session also indicate that for the majority of the CPSU CC 
Presidium members, the situation in Poland was different and could not be compared to 
that in Hungary.
101
 In this line, Khrushchev later stressed that in the case of Poland 
nervousness and haste had to be avoided and that the Polish comrades had to be 
assisted.
102
 As a whole, the Soviet decision-making during the Polish crisis shows that the 
Kremlin’s relations with Warsaw were not rigid, and were not always directed from 
Moscow. In Poland, the Soviets were willing to permit a certain degree of systemic 
change as long as the country did not defect from the socialist camp. At the same time, 
however, the Polish crisis probably established the limits of what was acceptable to the 
Soviets, and influenced to some extent their response to the Hungarian Revolution.
103
  
 
As in the case of Poland, during the Hungarian Revolution, the Soviet leadership 
initially adopted a realpolitik approach. For instance, different options for resolving the 
crisis were considered, and military invasion was not seen as the only suitable course of 
action. Between 23 and 30 October, a number of alternatives to resolve the crisis were 
discussed. On 23 October, for example, Mikoyan proposed a “cheaper” solution by trying 
political measures, which consisted in leaving Nagy and the Hungarian forces to deal 
with the situation.
104
  Similarly on 28 October, the CPSU CC Presidium decided to 
support the Nagy government and discussed peaceful options such as issuing an appeal to 
the workers, peasants and intelligentsia in Hungary and asking the fraternal communist 
parties to appeal to the Hungarians.
105
 Several Soviet leaders also expressed their 
wariness about using force in the country. Bulganin, for example, suggested that the 
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Soviet Union should support the Nagy government, since proceeding with an occupation 
would be a “dubious venture”, and Khrushchev commented that the English and French 
were in a real mess in Egypt and implied that Moscow should avoid getting involved in a 
similar situation.
106
  On 30 October 1956 the Presidium adopted the “Declaration by the 
Government of the USSR on the Principles of Development and Further Strengthening of 
Friendship and Cooperation between the Soviet Union and Other Socialist States” which 
opened the prospect of the future withdrawal of Soviet troops from Hungary and the 
satellites in Eastern Europe.
107
 Khrushchev stated that, in Hungary, Moscow had to 
choose between a “military path – one of occupation” and “a peaceful path – the 
withdrawal of troops, negotiations”.108 The Presidium ended up supporting the latter. For 
a short period of time it seemed that the Soviet leadership would be able to break away 
from the constraints of its ideologized foreign policy. This idea is supported by the fact 
that during the 28 October session, the Presidium ruled against the use of force in 
Hungary despite the growing anti-Soviet mood in the country and the admission of 
democrats in the MDP.
109
 Moscow also chose the peaceful path even though Suslov’s and 
Mikoyan’s 30 October report claimed that party organizations in Hungary were 
collapsing, that the Hungarian army was probably unreliable given that some units  were 
likely to join the rebels and that the Nagy government was preparing to protest against 
the Soviet military intervention at the UN.
110
 Nagy’s announcement of the creation of a 
multi-party system also didn’t seem to affect the CPSU discussions that day.111  
The final decision to pursue a military solution was not automatic, and the CPSU 
Presidium did struggle with the issue of whether to send Soviet troops or not. The 
members of the Soviet Presidium were also not always unanimous in their decisions 
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regarding the Soviet policy in Hungary. For example, the differences of opinion within 
the CPSU CC Presidium are visible during the 23 October session. While Khrushchev 
made a proposal to send troops to Budapest and was supported in this view by Bulganin, 
Molotov, Zhukov and Suslov, among others, Mikoyan was more guarded and favoured 
political measures.
112
 In fact, throughout most of the crisis, notwithstanding the 
worsening of the situation, Mikoyan rejected military intervention. Similarly, during the 
28 October CPSU CC Presidium session, Zhukov expressed his view that the Soviet 
Politburo should display “political flexibility” with respect to Hungary.113 Voroshilov, in 
fact, was the only Presidium member who didn’t embrace the peaceful path that day. The 
Malin Notes show that on a number of occasions during the 23, 28, 30 and 31 October 
sessions the majority of the Presidium members tended to agree with the position adopted 
by Khrushchev, even though they had previously expressed the opposite view.
114
 This 
pattern of supporting Khrushchev’s position probably helps explain the dramatic rejection 
of the 30 October compromise solution in favour of a military one on 31 October. 
As in the case of Poland, the ad-hoc nature of the Soviet decision-making is also 
apparent with regards to Hungary. The final decision in favour of invasion, which was 
taken on 31 October 1956, after rejecting the peaceful solution endorsed on the previous 
day, can be seen as indicative of the ideological concerns of Khrushchev about letting 
Hungary leave the Soviet bloc. According to the Malin Notes, Khrushchev merely 
announced to the Presidium that the Soviet troops should not be withdrawn from 
Budapest and Hungary and that order in the country had to be restored.
115
 He also 
stressed the need to defend the Soviet empire’s international reputation and pointed out 
that leaving Hungary would be a boost for the imperialists.
116
 Notably, only Saburov was 
still in favor of the “liberal position” endorsed by the majority of the Presidium members 
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the previous day.
117
 Mikoyan, who was not present during this decisive session, later 
insisted in front of Khrushchev that the Soviet Union should not use force in Hungary, 
since this would damage the reputation of the Soviet government and party.
118
 The 
existing sources don’t reveal the exact reason behind the shift of the Soviet position. It is 
possible that the Soviet leadership reviewed the worrisome 30 October report of Suslov 
and Mikoyan and realized that the Soviet declaration on 30 October would be insufficient 
to preserve communist one-party rule in Hungary. Even though the declaration expressed 
the Soviet desire to have more balanced relations with its satellite states it also 
established the limits of what Moscow was willing to tolerate – the envisioned reforms 
were meant to maintain a socialist system internally, and to strengthen the intra-block 
alliance system.
119
 Viewed in this light, it is dubious whether Moscow really was 
prepared to let Hungary leave the socialist camp. The Soviet leadership apparently felt 
constrained by official ideology while attempting to move in the direction of flexible 
realpolitik. At the same time, the Soviet zigzags in policy suggest that the Soviet leaders 
didn’t have a program on how to proceed, and that a small window of opportunity did 
exist for Hungary to break away from the socialist bloc. 
The Soviet leaders’ abrupt shifts of position during the Hungarian Revolution 
might be partially explained by their misunderstanding of the processes underway in the 
country. Earlier Soviet reports on Hungary were contradictory. They ranged from 
Suslov’s June positive assessment of the healthy mood of the peasants and workers, to 
Mikoyan’s more accurate account of the party loosening its grip on power in July, and 
Andropov’s alarming report on “subversive activity” within the population directed 
against the HWP leadership.
120
 According to Malashenko, even before the first 
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intervention, the Soviet leadership did not evaluate realistically the situation in the 
country.
121
 A report from 24 October conveyed Mikoyan’s and Suslov’s impression that 
the Hungarian authorities were “mastering” the situation, and that Gerő and some other 
comrades were “exaggerating the opponent’s strength and underestimating their own” 
even though there was evidence that the Hungarian army was performing poorly.
122
 
Similarly, on 27 October Suslov and Mikoyan also reported positively that “as a whole 
the new government [was] reliable, and in the social sense more authoritative”.123 Their 
more sober 30 October assessment of the situation didn’t produce an immediate change 
of the Soviet position. Thus, it can be argued that Soviet initial restraint was probably the 
result of misinformation and misperception of the events underway.  
It is significant that the Hungarian declaration of neutrality was not the reason for 
the Soviet decision to stage a second invasion. The Soviet decision to proceed with an 
intervention was taken on 31 October 1956 before the issue of Hungary’s neutrality was 
addressed at the Nagy government meeting on 1 November.
124
 On the same day, 1 
November, the Hungarian government decided that the country would leave the Warsaw 
Pact. The Hungarian demands for neutrality, however, were not new. Following the 20
th
 
Congress of the Communist Party in Moscow, some Hungarians had expressed a desire 
for the country to become neutral, and Soviet officials were informed about this. Calls for 
Hungary to leave the Warsaw Pact were made on October 31 on Radio Budapest and 
Béla Kovács, a member of Nagy’s cabinet, had called for neutrality during a speech in 
Pécs on October 31.
125
 While the Malin Notes show that the Soviet leaders received the 
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news about the Pécs speech on 31 October, it is unclear whether they learned about its 
content on the same day.
126
 It is possible that Moscow foresaw that Nagy might announce 
Hungary’s withdrawal from the Warsaw Pact and acted preemptively by deciding to 
proceed with a second invasion.
127
 These facts raise the question of whether there was a 
real possibility for Hungary to leave the Warsaw Pact. As already seen, in the period 
between the two interventions, the Soviet leaders vacillated between adopting a practical 
approach and letting Hungary go, and finally deciding to intervene based on ideological 
considerations. The fact that the Austrian State Treaty was concluded in 1955 and that 
ideas about Germany’s neutrality and the creation of a neutral “buffer” between the two 
blocs were discussed in Moscow suggests that a small window of opportunity for 
Hungarian withdraw from the Warsaw Pact probably did exist.
128
 The Soviet leadership 
apparently knew about the Hungarians’ calls for neutrality in the summer of 1956 but 
didn’t address officially the question. The possibility of Hungary leaving the Warsaw 
Pact and becoming a neutral state was also not mentioned at the Soviet Presidium 
sessions in the days preceding the October 31 decision to send troops. Therefore, it is 
unclear how such an option was viewed by Moscow.  In the mid-1950s the Soviet leaders 
envisioned the creation of belts of neutral or non-aligned states in Europe.
129
 Moscow 
also sought to strengthen “neutralism” and improve the Soviet relations with the existing 
neutral states – for example, it attempted a rapprochement with Yugoslavia and gave 
back the Porkkala naval base to Finland.
130
  Still, the Soviet position on neutrality was 
somewhat ambivalent. A statement by Molotov in May 1955 that the Austrian example 
could be applied to other states was followed by an article in Pravda arguing that the 
West should not challenge the Soviet status quo in Eastern Europe, implying thereby that 
Austrian neutrality was not “exportable”.131 In 1957, after the suppression of the 
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Hungarian Uprising, Mikoyan also emphasized that Austria was a special case which 
could not be replicated under the existing conditions.
132
  Thus, it is rather unlikely that 
the Soviet leaders would have welcomed the decision of a Warsaw Pact member state to 
become neutral. This would have affected negatively the existing balance of power 
which, as the case of Hungary in 1956 shows, Khrushchev ultimately decided to preserve. 
At the same time, Khrushchev’s zigzags in policy towards Hungary suggest that for brief 
moment of time in 1956, the Soviet leaders were ready to abandon the ideologized 
foreign policy behind in favor of a more flexible realpolitik. 
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4. The Prague Spring 1968 
Unlike the position of the Soviet leadership during the Hungarian Revolution, 
when Khrushchev and the Presidium members vacillated between peaceful and coercive 
policy options of resolving the crisis, during the Prague Spring, the position of the Soviet 
Politburo members remained constrained by the commitment to ideology. This is visible 
in the fact that even though the Soviet Politburo was not unanimous on how to respond to 
the challenge posed by the Prague Spring, the differences of opinions were over methods 
used rather than principle. Everyone seemed to agree that the gains of socialism in 
Czechoslovakia had to be preserved. For instance, during the months preceding the 
intervention, the Soviet leadership was divided between those promoting a Soviet 
military intervention in Czechoslovakia, and those who favored giving Dubček and the 
KSČ more time to restore order on their own.133 However, there were no “doves”, given 
that all members of the Politburo fell somewhere on the spectrum of hawkishness.
134
 
According to Aleksandrov-Agentov, there were hawks, officials who came close to being 
doves, and others like Brezhnev who remained cautious.
135
 The KGB Chairman Yuri 
Andropov and the First Secretary of the Ukrainian Communist Party Petro Shelest 
showed an unwavering support for a military intervention at an earlier stage.
136
 As early 
as the 21 March1968 Soviet Politburo meeting, Shelest suggested that the Soviet Union 
should prepare for “extreme measures” including “military action”, and he was supported 
in this view by Shelepin, Solomentsev, and Andropov, who also recommended taking 
“concrete military measures”.137 In a report presented at the April 1968 Plenum of the CC 
CPSU, Shelest compared the 1956 events in Hungary to the situation in Czechoslovakia, 
where the imperialists were now using “peaceful means” to bring down the communist 
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regime, in order to suggest that Moscow should not wait for violence in Czechoslovakia 
to erupt in order to intervene militarily.
138
 This indicated a shift in the Soviet policy 
which was later codified in the Brezhnev Doctrine. The Soviet Defence Minister Grechko 
also demanded the reestablishment of order in Czechoslovakia early on, since the 
situation in Czechoslovakia could undermine the defence potential of the Warsaw Pact.
139
 
Other officials such as Kosygin, Shelepin and Demichev changed their views during the 
crisis, sometimes privileging military intervention, and at other times opting for a 
political solution.
140
 Aleksandrov-Agentov gives an account of a meeting in the spring of 
1968 when the Soviet ambassador to the ČSSR, Chervonenko, warned that if the Soviets 
intervened without the necessary political preparations, the Czechoslovaks would resist, 
which would lead to bloodshed and no one wanted this.
141
 The dislike of the members of 
the Politburo for spilling blood in a fraternal country partially explains the Soviet efforts 
to find a political solution to the crisis during the first six months. 
A consensus on the use of military force in Czechoslovakia was slow to emerge in 
the Soviet Politburo which reflects the Soviet usual reluctance to use force as a policy 
tool. It was only in the mid-summer of 1968 that a general agreement was reached that 
the situation in Czechoslovakia was extremely serious and that a military intervention 
would most probably take place.
142
 As late as 17 July 1968, Brezhnev emphasized that 
before adopting extreme measures, Moscow would privilege a political solution, through 
which the healthy forces in Czechoslovakia would crack down on the anti-socialist and 
counterrevolutionary forces, and preserve the role of the CPCz as the leading force in 
society.
143
 The prospects that the CPCz CC Presidium would take decisive measures 
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were, however, bleak. Simultaneously, Moscow began planning for “extreme measures” 
and started the preparation of documents intended to be published once the invasion was 
under way.
144
 The evidence shows that the Soviet leaders employed all the means 
available to them to persuade Dubček to join the “healthy forces” and find a domestic 
solution. It is only when these efforts failed that the Soviet Politburo decided during the 
22, 26 and 27 July meetings that a full-scale invasion was in order if the situation in the 
country did not change.
145
 At the 13, 14 and 15 August 1968 ad-hoc sessions, the 
Politburo members agreed that a military intervention in Czechoslovakia would lead to 
complications, but that postponing the Soviet response would entail the loss of 
Czechoslovakia as a socialist country.
146
 The final decision to use force was thus 
considered as a measure of last resort. Brezhnev’s fear that he would lose his position as 
General Secretary if Czechoslovakia leaves the socialist camp seems to have played a 
role in his final decision to opt for an intervention.
147
 Brezhnev’s reluctance to use force 
was also visible in his concern that key and final decisions on Czechoslovakia were made 
collectively by the leadership, therefore ensuring the “joint liability” for the final 
outcome.
148
 A final decision by the Soviet Politburo to intervene was reached 
unanimously only on August 17.
149
  
The transcripts of bilateral meetings, negotiations and summits, the Soviet letters 
to the KSČ leadership, and Brezhnev’s August telephone conversations with Dubček all 
demonstrate that the Soviet leaders and Brezhnev, in particular, made significant efforts 
to find a nonmilitary solution, by forcing Dubček to take more resolute measures to 
combat the counter-revolutionary forces. This political pressure was combined with a 
psychological one in the form of the Warsaw Pact Šumava maneuvers on the territory of 
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Czechoslovakia in June and July 1968.
150
 Throughout the spring and summer of 1968, 
Moscow made consistently the same demands on the Czechoslovak leaders - to restore 
censorship, replace radical reformers with officials from the healthy forces, dissolve the 
new political formations and reestablish the unity of the KSČ and its authority over the 
Czechoslovak society. The Warsaw Letter from 14-15 July was a clear ultimatum to the 
CPCz CC Presidium. The letter expressed the view that the dangerous policies in 
Czechoslovakia threatened the position of the communist party, and would lead to the 
destruction of socialist democracy and of the socialist system, thus undermining the 
foundations of the Soviet bloc’s security.151 The language of the letter and other 
documents is strongly suggestive of the ideological motivations of the Soviet leaders.  
The role of Brezhnev as a general secretary in trying to find a non-military 
solution in Czechoslovakia is particularly salient. A believer in personal diplomacy, in 
the days preceding the invasion, Brezhnev tried different methods to exert pressure on 
Dubček to force him to address the Soviet grievances and to avoid an intervention. For 
instance, during his telephone conversation with Dubček on 9 August, Brezhnev 
extended an offer for help. He also repeatedly voiced his concern that the commitments 
agreed upon during the Soviet-Czechoslovak talks at Čierna nad Tisou in July 1968 were 
not being fulfilled by the Czechoslovak leaders and warned Dubček that “this is very 
serious now”.152 During the 13 August conversation, Brezhnev urged Dubček to “resort 
to concrete measures”, and to say more openly along with the other Czechoslovak 
officials which types of measure they were expecting from the Soviet Union.
153
 Even 
though military assistance is not mentioned explicitly, it is clear that this is what 
Brezhnev implied when he said that the Soviet Politburo would take whatever measures it 
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believed were necessary in the ČSSR.154 Given the fact that by 13 August 1968, 
Brezhnev had already received a formal letter of invitation from the anti-reformist faction 
of the CPCz leadership requesting military assistance, it’s clear that the Soviet leader was 
eager to make a last effort to exert his influence on Dubček and make him join ranks with 
the pro-Soviet faction. On a number of occasions during his 13 August 1968 conversation 
with Brezhnev, Dubček said that he had the intention of stepping down from the position 
of CPCz CC first secretary, and that the Soviet leadership should take the measures they 
see as appropriate in Czechoslovakia.
155
 It was these comments and Dubček’s inability to 
provide a reasonable deadline for the implementation of the agreements reached at Čierna 
nad Tisou that ultimately convinced Brezhnev that the Czechoslovak leader was not in 
control of the situation, and that a military intervention was inevitable.  
Contrary to statements to the opposite, the Soviet invasion wasn’t motivated by 
the geostrategic objective of returning the Soviet troops in Czechoslovakia as has been 
previously claimed.
156
 Despite the fact that in 1966 Novotný hadn’t acquiesced to 
Brezhnev’s demand to station Soviet armed forces in Czechoslovakia, which had opened 
a gap between the battle groups in Poland and those in Hungary, it doesn’t appear that 
Brezhnev was resentful of the decision.
157
 Some evidence suggests that Brezhnev saw 
Novotný as a loyal ally if not an especially strong leader, and that his initial intention 
when he visited Prague in December 1967 was to “save” Novotný.158 It’s possible that 
the Soviets expected that Dubček, whom they called “our Sasha”, would be more 
accommodating on the question of stationing troops.
159
 After the invasion, the Moscow 
Protocol didn’t provide a precise date for the withdrawal of Soviet and allied forces. One 
clause stipulated that the latter were supposed to leave the ČSSR in stages, once the 
“threat to the gains of socialism in Czechoslovakia and threat to the security of the 
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countries of the socialist commonwealth had been eliminated”.160  In fact, the Soviet 
troops remained in the ČSSR until 1990. The invasion of Czechoslovakia thus reached 
the Soviet objective of stationing of troops in the country, thereby strengthening the 
Warsaw Pact’s security, even though this wasn’t the intended goal of the invasion.161  
 
Military issues such as Czechoslovakia’s commitment to the Warsaw Pact were as 
important for the Soviet decision to intervene in Czechoslovakia as were ideological 
concerns. Despite the fact that that the KSČ leadership expressed several times its loyalty 
to the Warsaw Pact, the Soviets clearly felt that the Prague Spring could undermine the 
Czechoslovak commitment to the Pact, and thereby Soviet interests in the region. For 
instance, the relaxation of the border controls of Czechoslovakia with respect to Western 
tourists entering the country posed a serious concern for Moscow, and was addressed on 
a number of occasions. During the May 1968 Soviet-Czechoslovak summit meeting in 
Moscow, Brezhnev criticized the fact that the Czechoslovak border with the FRG was 
open and allowing 40,000 tourists from the West to enter daily into Czechoslovakia 
without a background check.
162
 Brezhnev explained that this posed a problem for Poland, 
the GDR and the Soviet Union, which shared common interests through the Treaty of 
Mutual Defense.
163
 A July 1968 Soviet government diplomatic note to the Czechoslovak 
government, denouncing General Prchlík’s July criticism of the Warsaw Pact structures, 
similarly stressed that the defense of the ČSSR’s western borders was not a purely 
internal issue but that it touched upon the safety of all the Warsaw Pact member states.
164
 
The borders and security interests of the satellite states were seen as identical to those of 
the Soviet Union and the entire socialist camp. In this line, the 3 August 1968 Bratislava 
                                                          
160
 ‘Document No. 119: The Moscow Protocol, August 26, 1968’, in The Prague Spring 1968: A National 
Security Archive Documents Reader, ed. by Jaromír Navrátil et al. (Budapest: Central European University 
Press, 1998), pp. 478. 
161
 Petrov, ‘The KGB and the Czechoslovak Crisis’, p. 160. 
162
 ‘Document No. 28: Stenographic Account of the Soviet-Czechoslovak Summit Meeting in Moscow, May 
4-5, 1968 (Excerpts) ’, in The Prague Spring 1968: A National Security Archive Documents Reader, ed. by 
Jaromír Navrátil et al. (Budapest: Central European University Press, 1998), p. 122. 
163
 ‘Document No. 28: Stenographic Account’, p. 122. 
164
 ‘Document No. 60: Soviet Government Diplomatic Note to the Czechoslovak Government, July 20, 
1968’, in The Prague Spring 1968: A National Security Archive Documents Reader, ed. by Jaromír Navrátil 
et al. (Budapest: Central European University Press, 1998), p. 266. 
40 
 
Declaration stipulated that the Warsaw Pact countries would “resist any attempt to revise 
the results of the Second World War and to change existing borders in Europe”, and 
would “pursue a coordinated policy on European matters” consistent with the interests of 
the socialist countries and European security.
165
The implication was that the Soviet 
Union would not allow the revision of the borders in Europe and the withdrawal of 
Czechoslovakia from the Warsaw Pact. 
 
The Soviet decision to intervene in Czechoslovakia can also be seen as a practical 
decision motivated by realpolitik considerations in the context of the Soviet calls for an 
all-European collective security system based on the geo-political status quo in Eastern 
Europe. The Soviet leaders seem to have had a clear understanding of the situation in 
Czechoslovakia in so far as they acknowledged the fact that the KSČ was losing its 
control over the reform process and Dubček was unwilling or unable to adhere to the 
agreements at Čierna nad Tisou.166 The KSČ’s Action Program from April 1968 
proclaimed the autonomy of the organs of the state and redefined the role of the 
Communist Party, which now only determined the political terms of the direction of 
society.
167
 This was a radical departure, since the party could no longer exert tight control 
over all social organizations and institutions. The reforms in Czechoslovakia were, 
therefore, clearly leading to the collapse of the communist regime, and to the possible 
reassessment of the country’s membership in the Warsaw Pact. For Brezhnev, who saw 
Czechoslovakia, the GDR and Poland as the core of the Warsaw Pact, and who 
considered relations with Czechoslovakia to be an essential component for the Soviet 
European policy and the East-West balance of forces, these were dangerous 
developments.
168
 Equally dangerous was the prospect that the liberalization of 
Czechoslovakia would produce a political spill-over and undermine the stability of other 
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Warsaw Pact countries in the region precisely at a moment when Brezhnev was seeking 
recognition of the post-Second World War borders in Europe. This would have 
threatened Brezhnev’s idea of a European Security System linking the two blocs based on 
the post-war status quo.
169
 Moscow’s intervention in Czechoslovakia thus had a lot to do 
with preserving the gains of socialism and the Soviet sphere of influence in Eastern 
Europe.  
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5. Polish Crisis 1980-1981 
Similar to the previous crises of Hungary in 1956 and Czechoslovakia in 1968, 
the military option for resolving the Polish crisis was considered by the Kremlin before 
being abandoned in the summer of 1981. The Soviet Politburo’s initial response to the 
rise of Solidarity in 1980 and its challenge to the Communist Party monopoly of power 
was to issue a resolution on 28 August 1980 authorizing the mobilization of 100,000 
military reservists and 15,000 vehicles to ensure that a large segment of the Russian 
forces would be in full combat readiness in case military assistance was needed in 
Poland.
170
 Even though the divisions returned to their previous state of readiness shortly 
afterwards, the military planning that took place suggests that at that point Moscow was 
initially ready to contemplate the option of using armed force in support of the Polish 
leadership.
171
 By the end of the year, however, the Soviet leadership opted for a political 
solution of the crisis. For instance, during the 5 December 1980 Warsaw Pact meeting 
Brezhnev indicated that while the Polish leadership was allowed to solve the crisis by 
political means and the Soviets did not “favour extreme measures without extreme 
circumstances”, Moscow would not hold back if the enemy took power.172 At this point, 
the plans for a Warsaw Pact intervention were not yet completely abandoned, and new 
manoeuvres of the Polish military and foreign troops were planned.
173
 Even though 
Moscow chose to compromise with Kania and leave the resolution of the crisis in his 
hands, at this point the Soviet leadership was not ready to let Poland leave the socialist 
bloc or the Warsaw Pact. 
As in the previous cases of Hungary and Czechoslovakia, as the crisis developed, 
Moscow adopted a cautious approach, and employed simultaneously different methods 
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such as intimidation, military manoeuvres, and political and economic pressure to try to 
induce the Polish leadership to implement martial law. For instance, from the spring of 
1981, the Soviet strategy was to exert pressure on the Polish leaders by exploiting to the 
maximum the Polish fears of Soviet intervention.
174
 Brezhnev articulated the Soviet dual 
strategy towards Poland as trying not to exasperate the Polish leaders and “build up their 
nervousness so that they lose heart” while exerting constant pressure on them to make 
them see their policy mistakes and provide them with guidance in a comradely way.
175
  
This resolution was accompanied by military pressure in the form of the Soiuz-80, Soiuz-
81 and later that year Zapad-81exercises. Yet, despite Andropov’s and Ustinov’s efforts 
at the April Brest meeting to force Kania and Jaruzelski to proceed with a crackdown on 
Solidarity, no precise date for implementing martial law was set.
176
 The Soviets 
increasingly adopted the view that the Polish leadership should take the initiative in 
finding an internal solution by deploying its security organs and the army before 
demanding outside support, otherwise, difficulties on the international level could 
ensue.
177
 By the spring of 1981, there was a clear sense of Soviet concern about the 
international complications in the Soviet relations with Western Europe and the United 
States that would arise if Soviet troops were introduced in Poland. 
It can be argued that the Soviet rejection of the option of providing military 
assistance to the PUWP presaged a major turn in Soviet foreign policy. By abandoning 
the idea of sending Soviet and Warsaw Pact troops to Poland in the summer of 1981, in 
practice, the Soviet leadership chose to leave Marxist-Leninist ideology behind in favour 
of a more flexible realpolitik, which served better Soviet interests. This foreshadowed the 
official death of the Brezhnev Doctrine later on. For instance, as early as mid-June 1981, 
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all the attendees of a military consultation of the Soviet General Staff except for Marshal 
Kulikov agreed that the decision to intervene in Poland would be unwise, as the Soviet 
forces were likely to encounter heavy armed resistance.
178
 During the meeting, General 
Gribkov, Sokolov and Epishev emphasized that an invasion might have a negative impact 
on the Soviet national interest and international prestige.
179
 The same decision was 
reached at a Politburo meeting taking place simultaneously, during which Suslov 
concluded that under no circumstances Soviet troops should be introduced into Poland.
180
 
In fact, the Kremlin even considered the possibility that if the social democrats came to 
power in Poland, the Soviet Politburo would work with them.
181
 Thus, by the summer of 
1981, Moscow had secretly ruled out a military intervention even though the Polish 
leaders were not made aware of that and the Soviet political and economic pressure 
continued. The Soviets’ intention to abstain from using force in Poland was subsequently 
reiterated on at least two occasions. During the 29 October Politburo meeting, both 
Andropov and Ustinov commented that the introduction of Soviet troops into Poland was 
out of the question.
182
 At the decisive 10 December Politburo meeting, Andropov, 
Gromyko, Ustinov and Suslov were unanimous that Soviet troops should not be 
introduced into Poland.
183
 Moreover, Suslov pointed out that the Soviet Union should not 
have to exert pressure on Poland to take more decisive action, and that the country’s 
leadership should be left to choose its policy.
184
 Even more radical was Andropov’s 
comment that if Solidarity came to power in Poland, then that’s the way things would 
be.
185
 This suggests that the Soviet leadership was resigning itself to the course of events 
in Poland. In this context, it is significant that Solidarity had not called for Poland’s 
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withdrawal from the Warsaw Pact, or for an end of the communist regime in the country 
even though it had made political demands.
186
 In fact, most Poles were in favour of 
maintaining military ties with the Soviet Union because of the perceived German 
threat.
187
 Soviet leaders most likely expected that even if Poland fell under Solidarity’s 
control, it would continue to abide by its Warsaw Pact obligations. Perhaps, this idea was 
reinforced by Moscow’s awareness that Walesa was a moderate, and by the hope that the 
extremists would not take control over Solidarity. 
 
The Polish crisis also marked a turning point in the way Moscow saw its own 
interests and those of the satellite states. The change in the Soviet policy towards Poland 
in 1980-1981testifies to Moscow’s increasing concern about its own national interests, 
which were now seen as separate from those of the satellite states. This is exemplified by 
the Soviet preoccupation with anti-socialist spillover effects of the Polish crisis in the 
Soviet Union in three different areas in particular. First, the Soviet leadership was 
especially worried that the developments in Poland were affecting the Soviet Army. In a 
1981 report on the work of the Committee on State Security of the USSR, Andropov 
reported to Brezhnev that “mass subversive ideological actions” targeting the personnel 
of Soviet military units in Poland and Afghanistan had taken place.
188
 A second 
disturbing development for the Kremlin was the rise of nationalist sentiments within the 
Soviet Union and the Western republics in particular. Related to that, there was an 
increasing preoccupation in Moscow with the liberalization of the Polish media and its 
effects in the Soviet Union and the western provinces in particular. During an April 1981 
CPSU CC Politburo meeting, Andropov pointed out that Polish-language radio and 
television could be picked up in many villages in Belorussia.
189
 He also expressed his 
concerns that unrest had erupted in different regions, most notably in Georgia, where 
                                                          
186
 Ouimet, The Rise and Fall’, p. 277-313.  
187
 Mastny, ‘The Warsaw Pact as History’, p. 53. 
188
 Mark Kramer, Soviet Deliberations during the Polish Crisis, 1980-1981 (Washington, D.C.: Cold War 
International History Project, Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, 1999), p. 173. 
189
 ‘Document No. 39: Transcript of CPSU CC Politburo Meeting’, April 2, 1981, in From Solidarity to 
Martial Law: The Polish Crisis of 1980-1981: A Documentary History, ed. by A. Paczkowski and M. Byrne 
(Budapest: Central European University Press, 2006), p. 243. 
46 
 
anti-Soviet slogans had been heard and strong measures needed to be implemented 
internally.
190
 A 1981 report from Andropov also accounted for the suppression of 
attempts to form nationalist groups in Ukraine, the Baltic republics, Armenia and other 
republics.
191
What is notable about these comments and reports are Soviet worries about 
the political situation within the USSR. The Soviet Union took internal measures to put a 
stop to the unrest rather than deciding to tackle the source of the problem, which was the 
PUWP’s lack of control over the mass media in Poland. Considering past Soviet 
decision-making in similar circumstances, it is noteworthy that the Soviet Politburo 
waited for months for Jaruzelski to impose martial law and did not undertake more 
drastic measures to ensure that the control of the PZPR over Polish society was restored.   
Third, as the crisis in Poland progressed, considerations about the economic 
issues within the Soviet Union took precedence over the strategic implications of losing 
Poland. This suggests that by 1981 the Soviet leaders were already redefining the way in 
which the Soviet leaders were thinking about security. Contrary to the previous crises in 
Hungary and Czechoslovakia, economic factors were discussed very often during the 
Polish crisis deliberations. Numerous transcripts of CPSU CC Politburo meetings 
from1980-1981 account for Moscow’s acute awareness of Poland’s economic difficulties 
and its dependence on Western credits.
192
 However, as the crisis progressed, Moscow 
also became concerned about being overstretched and restricted in its ability to provide 
aid to Poland.
193
 There was also an increasing feeling that the Soviet Union’s support in 
raw materials was not sufficiently appreciated by the Poles.
194
 At the 10 December 
Politburo meeting, for example, Suslov expressed the opinion that Jaruzelski was being 
cunning and was making requests for aid that the Soviet Union didn’t have the physical 
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ability to fulfill.
195
  Moscow’s shift in focus towards Soviet national interests was most 
clearly articulated by Andropov.  For him, the imposition of economic and political 
sanctions on the Soviet Union by the West would be more damaging for Soviet interests 
than the rise to power of Solidarity in Poland.
196
  
The Soviet military non-intervention in Poland and the patience which Moscow 
showed towards Kania and Jaruzelski are surprising in light of the Soviet decision-
making during previous crises. Many of the conditions which had led to the 1968 
invasion of Czechoslovakia were present in Poland. For instance, the fact that the Polish 
mass media was not controlled by the party was a major source of worry for the Soviet 
leaders. Among other appeals to the Polish leadership, a protest note by the Soviet 
Politburo to the PUWP CC expressed Moscow’s frustration about the anti-Soviet 
campaign in Poland, exemplified by the “Appeal to the Peoples of Eastern Europe”, 
which aimed to destroy the ties between the socialist countries and to make Poland leave 
the socialist camp.
197
 Significantly, by April 1981 the Politburo already recognized that 
the PUWP was no longer in control of the social processes taking place in Poland, and 
that Solidarity as an organized political force threatened the authority of the party and the 
state organs.
198
 As the crisis progressed, Moscow also grew increasingly distrustful of 
Kania and Jaruzelski, but also realized that there wasn’t a viable alternative to their 
leadership. Last but not least, the loyalty and reliability of the Polish security forces were 
also questioned. Both Kania and Jaruzelski claimed that the Polish army and the security 
forces could not be counted on to provide support to the party and the Polish leadership in 
a critical situation.
199
 With the Soviet decision not to send Soviet troops to Poland in 
December, it is possible that Poland would have experienced a “Finlandization” if 
Jaruzelski’s crackdown had not occurred in December 1981.200 The Soviet decision not to 
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intervene in Poland was indicative of a major change in Moscow’s foreign policy, as 
socialist internationalism ceased to be its main principle.
201
 The Soviet national interests 
were redefined, making Soviet economic and political relations with the West more 
important than maintaining Moscow’s control over the Eastern bloc. Significantly, the 
shift of focus in Moscow’s foreign policy priorities had already occurred when Mikhail 
Gorbachev became General Secretary in 1985 and developed the concept of a common 
European home. 
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6. The 1989 Peaceful Revolutions 
Contrary to the previous crises in 1956, 1968 and 1981, when differences of 
opinion existed within the Politburo regarding the necessity of using coercive measures, 
by the autumn of 1989, no one in the Soviet leadership was in favour of employing 
military force to prevent the fall of the socialist regimes in Eastern Europe. According to 
Shevardnadze, in 1989, following the scenarios of 1953, 1956 and 1968 was not an 
option, since it would have meant sacrificing the principles of freedom of choice and 
non-interference, as well as the idea of common European home Gorbachev was trying to 
build.
202
 Significantly, even Gorbachev’s critics who were in charge of security and 
foreign policy affairs, Vladimir Kryuchkov and Marshal Dmitry Yazov for instance, 
abstained from holding the general secretary responsible for the loss of Eastern 
Europe.
203
 As late as 1990, the hawkish Soviet defense minister Yazov was of the opinion 
that coercive measures should not be employed outside of the Soviet Union, and neither 
the KGB nor the Soviet military ever suggested a plan to crack down on the anti-
government unrest in the socialist bloc.
204
 Perhaps most revealing of the general mood at 
the time was a comment made by Kryuchkov who admitted that, in the 1980s, the use of 
force in Eastern Europe became impossible due to the negative views of Soviet society 
towards such methods.
205
 Despite the fact that the Soviet troops in the GDR were 
prepared to restore order in 1989, Soviet society as a whole was averse to such actions.
206
 
Similarly, Gorbachev’s main concern in November 1989 was making sure that the Soviet 
troops in East Germany would not resort to force, since such a decision would have been 
against his principles and would have jeopardized his plans for a common European 
home.
207
 All the available sources thus, show that in 1989 neither Gorbachev and his 
circle of reformers, nor the conservatives in the Soviet establishment believed that 
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invoking the Brezhnev doctrine and intervening in the satellite states’ internal affairs was 
a plausible option. 
The Soviet use of force in Eastern Europe in 1989 to preserve the status quo was 
also very unlikely for a number of reasons. First, from 1985 on, Gorbachev made 
numerous statements to the Soviet leadership and signaled to the party leaders of Eastern 
Europe that the Brezhnev doctrine would no longer be enforced and that the relations 
with the satellites would be governed by new principles. For instance, at the meeting of 
the PCC of the Warsaw Pact on 21 October 1985, Gorbachev presented his new approach 
towards the East European allies which emphasized equality, respect for national 
sovereignty and independence, and also suggested that the ruling parties in the satellite 
states were now accountable for the conditions in their countries.
208
 On 28 May 1986, 
during a speech to the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Gorbachev also spoke of the 
new type of relationship between Moscow and the East European states in which the 
latter would be allowed to adopt national approaches even though some of their decisions 
might be detrimental to the common objective of the bloc.
209
 Gorbachev’s rejection of the 
Brezhnev Doctrine became even more apparent at the CPSU Politburo session on 3 July 
1986 when he stated clearly that “the methods that were used in Czechoslovakia and 
Hungary now are no good” and won’t work.210 This position was reiterated during a 
session of the CPSU Politburo in May 1989 where Gorbachev emphasized that the “use 
of force is out of the question” – coercive methods were excluded from Soviet foreign 
policy and were ruled out by the general secretary even within the Soviet Union.
211
 
Gorbachev’s speech to the United Nations General Assembly in December 1988 with its 
rejection of the use and threat of force as a foreign policy tool, its proclamation of the 
freedom of choice as a universal principle and its emphasis on the primacy of common 
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human values signaled to the Western governments Moscow’s official repudiation of the 
Brezhnev Doctrine.
212
 Given these statements, using military measures to suppress the 
anti-government uprisings in 1989 would have been against Gorbachev’s new thinking 
and would have discredited him in the eyes of the Western governments whose economic 
and political cooperation Gorbachev needed. 
Second, it was also highly unlikely that Moscow would employ coercive methods 
to prevent the peaceful revolutions in 1989 because Gorbachev had already demonstrated 
in practice to the socialist countries that the Soviet Union would not interfere in their 
internal affairs. For instance, in September 1988, Gorbachev endorsed the Roundtable 
negotiations and the program of reforms in Poland.
213
 Gorbachev also acted according to 
the principles he had discussed with Czyrek in 1988 and Jaruzelski in April 1988, and 
avoided interfering in Polish internal affairs and criticizing the Polish Communists when 
they lost in the elections.
214
 Moreover, when Miklós Németh informed Gorbachev in 
March 1989 that the Hungarian leadership had decided to remove the electronic and 
technological defenses from the country’s Western and Southern borders since they were 
no longer useful, Gorbachev merely replied that the Soviet Union had a strict regime on 
its borders, but was becoming more open.
215
 Despite the fact that the removal of the 
barbed wire fence could possibly affect the stability of the neighboring bloc countries, as 
it turned out to be the case, faithful to his principles, Gorbachev avoided interfering in the 
internal affairs of Hungary. The Hungarian government’s decision to open its borders to 
permit East German tourists to go to West Germany via Austria was fatal for the stability 
of the government of the GDR.
216
  Similarly, during the summer of 1989, in a telephone 
                                                          
212
 ‘The Gorbachev Visit; Excerpts From Speech to U.N. on Major Soviet Military Cuts’, The New York 
Times, 8 December 1988, U.N. http://www.nytimes.com/1988/12/08/world/the-gorbachev-visit-excerpts-
from-speech-to-un-on-major-soviet-military-cuts.html?pagewanted=all 
213
 ‘Document  No. 28: Record of Conversation between Mikhail Gorbachev and Józef Czyrek, September 
23, 1988’, in Masterpieces of History: the Peaceful End of the Cold War, ed. by S. Savranskaya, T. Blanton, 
and V. Zubok (Budapest, New York, NY: Central European University Press, 2010), p. 304. 
214
 Svetlana Savranskaya, ‘The Fall of the Wall, Eastern Europe, and Gorbachev’s Vision of Europe after the 
Cold War’, in Imposing, Maintaining and Tearing Open the Iron Curtain: the Cold War and East-Central 
Europe, 1945-1989, ed. by M. Kramer and V. Smetana (Lanham: Lexington Books, 2014), p. 343. 
215
 ‘Document No. 50: Record of Conversation between Mikhail Gorbachev and Miklós Németh, March 3, 
1989’, in Masterpieces of History: the Peaceful End of the Cold War, ed. by S. Savranskaya, T. Blanton, and 
V. Zubok (Budapest, New York, NY: Central European University Press, 2010), p. 412.  
216
 Mastny, ‘Why did the Cold War’, p. 10. 
52 
 
conversation with Rakowski, Gorbachev pursued his policy of non-interference by 
accepting the election of a coalition government in Poland despite the fact that this meant 
that Poland could decide to exit the Warsaw Pact.
217
 Gorbachev’s response in 1989 can 
be contrasted with that of Brezhnev in 1968, when the border issues in Czechoslovakia 
and the Soviet concerns about the country’s alignment were seen as an important threat to 
the security the Warsaw Pact. Obviously, by 1989, the Soviet perception of the concept 
of security was very different from that in 1968. While for Stalin and Brezhnev Eastern 
Europe was a buffer zone necessary for the Soviet security as they perceived it, for 
Gorbachev, the region was valuable in so far as it could contribute to Soviet security as a 
bridge to Western Europe in an integrated European continent.
218
 
Third, from the very beginning of Gorbachev’s tenure as general secretary, 
Eastern Europe was not high on his list of priorities which included more pressing issues 
such as domestic reforms, withdrawal from Afghanistan and arms control. In 1985-1986, 
Eastern Europe seemed important to Gorbachev mostly in relation to improving 
integration in the CMEA which was necessary in order to deal with the ECC collectively 
in a more efficient manner.
219
 By 1987, however, there was already a sense in Moscow 
that the CMEA was unsustainable and that the economic costs of the socialist countries 
were exceeding the benefits of sustaining the status quo in the region. For instance, 
during the CPSU Politburo session on 10 March 1988, the problems of the falling price of 
oil and the lack of real trade with the socialist countries, for which the Soviet Union was 
a provider of cheap resources, were addressed.
220
 Significantly, Gorbachev pointed out 
that, in its relations with the CMEA, Moscow should take care of its own people first 
while suggesting at the same time that the political stability in the socialist bloc was a 
vital interest for Moscow in terms of security and economic interests.
221
 Even though this 
statement suggests that Moscow was concerned about the political and economic stability 
in the region, Gorbachev was not willing to intervene to maintain the conservative 
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regimes in power. Stability in Eastern Europe was important in Gorbachev’s plans for 
Soviet bloc to bloc cooperation with the West, and maintaining socialism in Eastern 
Europe seemed to be of secondary importance. 
Fourth, intervening militarily in Eastern Europe was deemed as unwise because of 
the implications of such a move for Soviet relations with the Western states. A 
memorandum from CC CPSU International Department prepared in February 1989 stated 
that, in the future, it is unlikely that the Soviet Union would be able to “employ the 
methods of 1956 and 1968 both as a matter of principle and because of unacceptable 
consequences”.222 Another memorandum drafted by the Bogomolov Institute during the 
same month made it even more obvious that the Soviet use of force in Eastern Europe 
was not in the best Soviet interest. The memorandum pointed out that “attempts to 
preserve the status quo will weight as an excessive burden on our economy” and warned 
that intervening in support of the conservative forces in the satellites “will signify the end 
of perestroika and the crumbling of trust on the part of the world”.223 The arguments used 
in the memorandum were reminiscent of those employed in December 1981 by the Soviet 
leaders when they rejected armed intervention in Poland. In both cases, maintaining 
cooperative relations with the West was judged more important than preserving the status 
quo in Eastern Europe. Ultimately, ensuring Soviet security through relations with the 
West took precedence over commitment to ideological rationales.  
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7. Analysis – The Soviet Dual Policy 
Moscow’s long-term quest for all-European collective security and the Soviet 
commitment to an ideologized foreign policy, as seen through the case studies of crisis 
management, demonstrate that from the 1950s to the late 1980s Moscow attempted to 
balance between two often contradictory foreign policies. The Soviet decision-making 
during the crises in Hungary (1956) and Czechoslovakia (1968) shows that until the early 
1980s, when the Soviet security interests were threatened in Europe, the Kremlin leaders 
prioritized their commitment to an ideologized foreign policy over the need for security 
and cooperation with the West. The evidence from case studies demonstrates, however, 
that Moscow’s commitment to an ideologized foreign policy was not total.  For instance, 
use of force was never the Soviet leaders’ preferred method of resolving crises, 
disagreements between Politburo members were frequent and sometimes dramatic shifts 
in opinion preceded the final decision. Khrushchev’s zigzags in foreign policy included 
his efforts to strengthen Moscow’s ties with the Soviet satellites in Eastern Europe and 
the neutral states (Yugoslavia and Finland), while trying to promote an all-European 
collective security.
224
 Brezhnev also tried to reconcile the need to preserve the integrity of 
the Soviet bloc with the desire for cooperation with the West in the framework of the 
CSCE. Until the late 1970s, Moscow was able to pursue both policies in Europe without 
one impeding the other in major ways. For instance, Khrushchev’s efforts to convene an 
all-European collective security in Europe was followed by the Soviet military 
intervention in Hungary in 1956, which didn’t prevent the Soviets from continuing their 
campaign for a multilateral European security conference in the following years. 
Similarly, under Brezhnev, the Soviets tried to balance their commitment to Marxist-
Leninist ideology with the need for détente with the West in order to insure security, 
recognition of borders, and Western credits and investments. Brezhnev’s choice in 1968 
to send troops to Czechoslovakia to prevent the country from leaving the Soviet bloc and 
the Warsaw Pact coincided with Moscow’s objective of convening a multilateral 
European security conference to codify the geopolitical status quo in Europe. 
Significantly, the invasion of Czechoslovakia also did not have a major negative effect on 
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Soviet foreign affairs and didn’t prevent the upsurge of détente in the late 1960s.225 
Brezhnev’s commitment to the Helsinki CSCE process was demonstrated notably by his 
controversial decision to elevate détente over class struggle in 1973, despite the protests 
of other Soviet officials such as Suslov.
 226
 At the same time, Moscow’s commitment to 
the CSCE also did not necessarily prevail over the Soviet leaders’ determination to 
preserve the integrity of the Soviet bloc and abide by ideological rationales.  For instance, 
the signing of the Helsinki Final Act did not stop the Warsaw Pact’s chief of staff Sergei 
Shtemenko from stating that the main function of the Pact was to provide fraternal 
assistance in defense of socialism.
227
  
The late 1970s and early 1980s were a turning point for the Soviets’ foreign 
policy in Europe since, as the case study of Poland and the Soviet preoccupation with the 
fall of détente demonstrate, the Soviet commitment to an ideologized foreign policy in 
Europe became increasingly incompatible and difficult to balance with Moscow’s efforts 
to reduce the tensions with the West for the sake of political and economic cooperation. 
The simultaneous fall of détente, the slowdown in the Soviet economy, the Soviet 
invasion of Afghanistan, which damaged Moscow’s international reputation and had 
serious repercussions for the Soviet economy and technological development, and the 
eruption of the Polish crisis, in particular, forced Moscow to reevaluate Soviet security 
interests and to choose between détente and cooperation with the West, and preserving 
the Soviet “empire” in Eastern Europe, which was increasingly seen as a liability.   The 
1980-1981 Polish crisis demonstrated to the Soviet leaders in a practical way that 
Moscow’s ideologized policy in Europe was no longer favouring the Soviet national 
interest given the fact that it had led to isolation and had political and economic 
consequences which Moscow could not afford.
228
 The transcripts of CPSU CC Politburo 
meetings during the Polish crisis demonstrate that even before Gorbachev’s rise to power, 
Moscow was redefining its security interests. Notably, in December 1981, the Soviet 
leadership had already decided that the imposition of economic and political sanctions by 
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the West in case Soviet troops were introduced into Poland would be worse for 
Moscow’s interests than Solidarity taking power in Poland, and had resolved that 
strengthening the Soviet Union should be the leadership’s priority. 229 During Andropov 
and Chernenko’s time as general secretaries, the Soviet rulers already believed that a 
return to the policy of détente and scaling down the arms race were vital for the Soviet 
Union.
230
 Historically, the Soviet state had always needed “breathing spaces” which took 
the form of the NEP, the thaw and détente, and a long term trend in Soviet foreign policy 
had been the prolongation of these breathing spaces in a search for peaceful coexistence 
with the West.
231
  The extension of these transitional periods, however, led to the 
progressive erosion of ideology.
232
 By 1985, the role of ideology in the Soviet society 
was severely weakened both in theory and in practice. The principle of socialist 
internationalism was increasingly missing from official documents. For instance, 
proletarian or socialist internationalism were not cited in the documents espoused at the 
January 1983 Prague PCC meeting of the Warsaw Pact and instead there was a mention 
of a new type of international relations centered on “voluntary equal cooperation and 
international solidarity of sovereign socialist states”.233  
It can be argued that to some extent with his advancement of “new thinking” and 
the development of the concept of common European home, Gorbachev continued and 
accelerated trends that had already been visible in the 1970s and early 1980s. For 
instance, one of the main ideas of Gorbachev’s common European home concept was the 
rejection of the use or threat of force within or between alliances as Gorbachev 
proclaimed during his council of Europe speech.
234
  As the case study of the Polish crisis 
demonstrated, in the summer and fall of 1981, the Politburo had decided for practical 
reasons that the Soviet military intervention in Poland would be counterproductive. 
Stating that the Brezhnev Doctrine was dead in 1981 might be inaccurate since no major 
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crisis took place in the East European states until the peaceful revolutions in 1989 to test 
the Soviet willingness to employ coercive measures. However, nothing suggests either 
that after 1981 the Soviet leadership was ready to apply the Brezhnev Doctrine in Eastern 
Europe. In relation to this, one thing that all the case studies show is that Moscow was 
always reluctant to employ force in Eastern Europe as an instrument of foreign policy. 
Military intervention was seen as a measure of last resort to be used once all other 
political and psychological means of exerting pressure were exhausted. Gorbachev’s 
decision not to use force in 1989 has been often cited as one of the reasons that made the 
peaceful end of the Cold War possible. As the last two case studies, however, 
demonstrate, even in 1981 the Soviet leaders ruled unanimously against Soviet 
intervention in Poland and in 1989, the Politburo, the KGB and even the military were 
against the use of military means to preserve the status quo.  Their behavior was 
motivated by realpolitik considerations. Gorbachev’s pursuit of the policy of non-
interference in Eastern Europe, on the other hand, was driven by new thinking, by the 
desire not to jeopardize the prospect of common European home and by naivety and by 
utopianism, according to his own admission.
235
  
 
Another important element of continuity between Gorbachev and his predecessors 
is the fact that like them, Gorbachev tried to find a balance between the Soviet 
commitment to ideology and the need for security and cooperative relations with the 
West - this time, in the form of common European home. It is clear that Gorbachev saw 
reformed socialism as compatible with the idea of a common European home. In this 
sense, it is important to note that Gorbachev and his advisers wanted to preserve and 
reform socialism, not to replace it with Western liberalism. Gorbachev and the officials 
responsible for the relations with Eastern Europe were convinced that the Soviet Union 
didn’t have the right to intervene in the internal affairs of the East European satellite 
states, while at the same time they believed that the best way forward was the 
democratization of the socialist countries’ systems by adopting the Soviet reforms.236 
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Even though under Gorbachev the Soviet Union renounced the use and threat of force as 
an instrument of foreign policy and promoted new principles in its relations with the 
satellites, Gorbachev abandoned the principles of Marxism-Leninism late in 1989 only 
under the pressure of events. This unwillingness of Moscow to completely leave the 
Leninist legacy behind was responsible to a certain extent for the lack of clarity regarding 
the limits of Soviet tolerance to change in Eastern Europe.  For example, many 
discussions in late 1987 and 1988 among Soviet policy makers centred on whether the 
Soviet foreign policy should continue to be based on class values or on common human 
values, and Gorbachev remained ambivalent on the meaning of socialist internationalism 
in his speeches.
237
 As late as March 1989, in a conversation with the Hungarian party 
leader Károly Grósz, Gorbachev described the limit to the Soviet non-interference policy 
as the “safekeeping of socialism and assurance of stability” in the country.238  Yet, 
Moscow accepted the election of the first non-communist government in Poland in July 
1989 and didn’t protest when Hungary adopted a multi-party system and rejected 
Leninism as an ideology later on in 1989. Ultimately, Gorbachev became supportive of 
coalition governments in Eastern Europe as long as the changes of the regimes remained 
peaceful, did not pose a direct challenge to the Warsaw Pact and remained compatible 
with the common European home project.
 239
 In the autumn of 1989, Gorbachev still 
seemed to think that the path for the East European satellites was that of democratic 
socialism, even as other officials such as Chernyaev observed that “dismantling of 
socialism as a factor of world development” was already taking place.240 According to 
Chernyaev, it was only late in 1989 that Gorbachev stopped being concerned about the 
ideological consequences of the GDR ceasing to be an “outpost of socialism” in central 
Europe and his major priority became making sure that the process towards unification 
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would not lead to violence or impede the all-European process underway.
241
 Ultimately, 
as the revolutions in Eastern Europe took place and the Soviet Union was threatened by 
dissolution, Gorbachev was finally forced to abandon the commitment to socialism and 
his number one foreign policy objective became the building of a common European 
home. The idea of the latter, however, was soon severely compromised by the 
announcement of Kohl’s Ten-Point Program and the Western governments’ decision to 
support German reunification before Gorbachev’s common European home had the time 
to come to life.  
Finally, it can be argued that what made the peaceful end of the Cold War in 1989 
possible was Gorbachev’s attempt to reform socialism and make it more compatible with 
the ideas embodied in the concept of common European home. The Soviet reformers 
tried to give socialism a new meaning by redefining it, which would have made it more 
attractive both at home and in Eastern Europe. This redefinition would also allow for 
social democracy to be viewed as an acceptable variant of socialism.
242
 Doctrinal changes 
were nothing new – such changes were made by Khrushchev and Brezhnev in an effort to 
preserve the credibility of Marxism-Leninism, to make Marxism compatible with détente 
and ultimately to bridge the gap between doctrine and reality.
243
 Gorbachev and his circle 
of reformers, however, made sweeping changes, by rejecting the class-based 
“internationalism” which had been the foundation of Moscow’s foreign policy since the 
1920s. In 1988, the Warsaw Pact espoused the concept of common human values, and in 
July 1989 it established that there wasn’t a universal model of socialism and that no one 
possessed monopoly over the truth.
244
 From this moment on, the parties in Eastern 
Europe had the right to choose their own path of developing socialism. These were, 
however, fundamental changes to the basic principles of Marxism-Leninism which 
contributed to the loss of its legitimacy.
 245
 Moreover, once it became clear that Moscow 
would abide by the principles imbedded in the common European home concept and 
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would not use force to preserve the regimes in Eastern Europe in power, popular 
revolutions in the satellites erupted and these countries turned their back to Gorbachev’s 
“socialism with a human face”. By the late 1980s, the Soviet use of ideology to legitimize 
Moscow’s intervention in the internal affairs of the East European states and the more 
general long-term erosion of ideology had contributed to discredit socialism in Eastern 
Europe.  By 1989 it was seen as unredeemable and held no attraction in most East 
European countries. Therefore, by the end of the 1980s, socialism hardly stood the 
chance of being reformed and reconciled with the common European home Gorbachev 
had in mind. As it turned out to be the case after 1990, the states in Eastern Europe chose 
to join the EEC and NATO rather than to look for a place within the common European 
home Gorbachev envisioned.  Thus, Gorbachev falsely assumed that the Soviet bloc 
countries could not do without the Soviet Union in the long-run, while Moscow could 
manage without its empire in Eastern Europe.
246
  
 
In conclusion, as has been argued here, the end of the Cold War can be seen as the 
result of the pursuit by Moscow of two policies which became irreconcilable in the long 
run. At the same time, the immediate reason for the peaceful end of the Cold War in 1989 
was Gorbachev’s attempt to reform socialism by rejecting the use of force and trying to 
reconcile it with the idea of common European home. In this sense, Gorbachev’s 
personality and his ascension to the position of general secretary were decisive for the 
dramatic reforms untaken by the Soviet Union in the Cold War.
247
 The implementation of 
the new thinking and promotion of the idea of common European home would have been 
impossible without the power of the office of the general secretary. Under the highly 
hierarchical Soviet system only someone possessing vast arbitrary powers such as 
Gorbachev could have brought about such a decisive shift in foreign policy given the fact 
that reform could only begin from above.
248
 In relation to that, the appointment by 
Gorbachev of reformers to key positions was crucial for the transformation of the ideas of 
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the new thinkers into policies. Robert English has demonstrated how some key ideas 
advanced by the reformers such as global interdependence and indivisible security of the 
world were first put forward by the Soviet intelligentsia. The persistence of the idea of 
all-European collective security, on the other hand, shows that some of the ideas which 
helped bring about the end of the Cold War were first promoted by the Soviet 
establishment. 
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